The Cost of Kurdish Disunity: How Internal Rivalries Are Paralyzing the Kurdistan Region

The internal Kurdish political dispute, now stretching on for years, has pushed the formation of a new Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) into a prolonged stalemate. The major political actors remain deeply at odds, despite a successful election that drew citizens of the Kurdistan Region to the ballot boxes and restored a measure of hope to their households. Yet nearly two years on, the KRG has still not been formed. The Iraqi federal government, whose own elections were held months after those of the Kurdistan Region, has already seated a Speaker of Parliament and, on the 11th, confirmed the President of the Republic. The formation of the Kurdistan Regional Government, by contrast, appears further away today than it was even before the Iraqi vote took place.

Two Parties, One Region, No Agreement

At the center of the deadlock are the two dominant Kurdish political forces: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The two have jointly governed the Kurdistan Region since 1992. Politically, they stand far apart, yet in practical terms neither can run the region without the other. The Kurdistan Region remains effectively divided between their zones of influence, commonly referred to as the Yellow and Green zones, a reality that makes cooperation not a choice but a structural necessity.

For more than a year, both sides have maneuvered for advantage. The KDP points, with justification, to the fact that it received the largest share of votes not only in the Kurdistan Region but across all of Iraq. The PUK, meanwhile, has cultivated new alliances in Baghdad that have helped advance its own political agenda, giving it leverage it did not previously hold.

The Disputed Positions

The dispute centers on four key offices: the Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, the Prime Ministership, the Interior Ministry, and the Directorship of the Security Council. The KDP is claiming all four. Historically, the party has held these positions under a power sharing arrangement reached in 2005, which allocated the Iraqi presidency to the PUK and the leading KRG posts to the KDP. Today, however, neither party is fully honoring that understanding.

The PUK continues to claim the Iraqi presidency. Although the role is largely symbolic, it carries real economic and security benefits, and, crucially, it is constitutionally reserved for the Kurds in the same way the premiership is reserved for the Shia and the speakership for the Sunnis. Yet the PUK is not content with the presidency alone. It is also demanding one of the senior KRG portfolios: the Prime Ministership, the Interior Ministry, or the Security Council directorship. This dual demand is what has produced the current deadlock.

The KDP counters that its electoral performance entitles it to the senior regional positions. Its seat count in the Kurdistan Region equals the combined total of the PUK and the smaller parties. Beyond that, the KDP is now the second largest single party in all of Iraq, having won more individual votes than any other party except the leading Shia bloc. Because seats in Iraq are distributed by governorate, the KDP can hold the largest share of individual votes nationally while still ranking second in seats, a distinction that matters politically even if it does not always translate into bargaining power.

The KDP's position, in summary, is that it should retain the four main offices in the Kurdistan Region, with the remaining portfolios distributed fairly, and that the Iraqi presidency should go to the PUK as originally agreed.

A Kurdish Dispute That Baghdad Is Watching Closely

The PUK's rhetoric has transformed what was once a bilateral negotiation into a broader Kurdish crisis. The question of the Iraqi presidency has spilled into Kurdish internal politics, drawing in the smaller and minority parties and deepening the rift between the two main camps. The principal beneficiaries of this fragmentation are the Sunni and Shia political blocs in Baghdad, who have every reason to welcome a divided Kurdish front.

This division has come at a steep cost. Through sustained pressure and unilateral decisions from Baghdad, the Kurdistan Region has lost much of the autonomy and self governance that the Iraqi constitution formally guarantees it. The salaries of KRG public servants are a clear example. Baghdad treats these payments as ordinary public sector salaries to be managed from the federal budget, while the constitution clearly recognizes that the Kurdistan Region has its own budget, which the region itself is entitled to allocate according to its needs. Baghdad does not acknowledge this distinction in practice.

The same pattern applies to Article 140 of the constitution, which addresses the status of the disputed territories, including Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Sinjar, and the Nineveh Plains. Implementation has stalled for years, and without a unified Kurdish position in Baghdad, there is little prospect of movement.

Second Class Citizens Again

Without a strong and unified Kurdistan Regional Government, and without a coherent Kurdish bloc operating in Baghdad, the Kurds are once again being treated as second class citizens within their own country. This may appear to serve the short term interests of the federal government, but in strategic terms it works against Iraq as well. The Kurdistan Region has for years been the most stable, secure, and peaceful part of the country, and one of the few areas of calm in a volatile neighborhood. Weakening it weakens Iraq as a whole.

If the rights of the Kurds within federal Iraq, and indeed across the wider region, are to be defended and strengthened, the KDP and the PUK must find their way to an agreement. The cost of continued disunity is no longer theoretical. It is being paid, month after month, in lost autonomy, lost leverage, and lost public trust.