Al-Zaidi Unveils Government Formation Plan as Washington Tightens Grip on Baghdad
Iraqi Prime Minister-designate Ali al-Zaidi has presented his program for the formation of the new Iraqi government, arriving at a moment of profound regional escalation and a visible shift in the balance of power across the Middle East. The plan emerges in the wake of the U.S.–Israeli war against Iran and the disruption of oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz, two events that have reshaped both the security and economic environment in which Baghdad must operate. The United States has become considerably more involved in shaping this government than in any previous formation cycle, applying sustained pressure on the Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish blocs to converge on a workable cabinet within the constitutional thirty-day window granted to al-Zaidi.
The very circumstances of al-Zaidi's nomination underscore the depth of that American influence. After a deadlock of nearly five and a half months following the November 2025 elections, the Coordination Framework had initially backed former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. His candidacy collapsed only after President Donald Trump publicly threatened to cut off Iraq's access to the petrodollar and suspend cooperation with Iraqi security agencies should a pro-Iranian figure return to the premiership. A subsequent attempt to advance Bassem al-Badry was blocked by rival blocs that feared a consolidation of al-Maliki's faction. Al-Zaidi, a forty-year-old businessman, banker, and owner of Dijlah TV with no prior political office, ultimately emerged as a compromise candidate during a meeting at the residence of PMF chairman Falih al-Fayyad, with the support of al-Maliki, outgoing Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, and Asaib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais al-Khazali, and under the patronage of Supreme Judicial Council head Faiq Zaidan.
Al-Zaidi's program introduces a notably distinctive approach to the Popular Mobilization Forces, which currently sit at the center of Washington's pressure campaign on Iraqi leaders. According to the document, arms are to be restricted exclusively to the hands of the state, and the sovereignty of national institutions is to be prioritized. At the same time, the program pledges to develop the capacities of the PMF while defining its responsibilities, duties, and role within the broader military and security architecture. This deliberately ambiguous formulation appears designed to reassure the PMF and its political affiliates, securing the votes needed to pass the cabinet through parliament, where the Coordination Framework controls 185 of the 329 seats and where 167 votes are required for confirmation.
The ambiguity is far from accidental. The PMF, established in 2014 following the fatwa of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has grown into an umbrella of roughly sixty-seven factions and an estimated force of more than one hundred thousand fighters. While formally part of the Iraqi armed forces, several of its most powerful components, including Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kataib al-Imam Ali, retain operational and ideological loyalty to Tehran. Reports in recent days have suggested that Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib al-Imam Ali may transfer their weapons to the PMF as a gesture toward Washington's disarmament demands. In practice, however, both factions already command brigades embedded within the PMF's official structure, meaning such a transfer would amount to little more than moving arms from one hand to the other. Sources close to the file describe the move as a "theoretical framework" rather than a serious step toward disarmament, and as an early test of al-Zaidi's responsiveness to U.S. pressure as well as a bargaining chip to secure ministerial portfolios.
Washington, for its part, formally welcomed al-Zaidi's nomination through its embassy in Baghdad on April 29, and President Trump personally called the prime minister-designate, extending an invitation for him to visit the White House. On May 1, Trump went further, publicly stating that "the United States is with him all the way" and describing his selection as "a great victory." This unusual level of presidential engagement with an Iraqi premier reflects a calculation that al-Zaidi, lacking an independent political base and a parliamentary bloc of his own, may prove more pliable than his predecessors. Yet his profile is more complicated than it first appears. He previously chaired Al-Janoob Islamic Bank, which the U.S. Treasury sanctioned in 2024 over alleged money laundering on behalf of Iran and Iran-backed Iraqi militias, although a subsequent investigation by the financial crime firm K2 Integrity reportedly found no credible evidence linking him personally to such activities.
His broader network further complicates Washington's bet. Al-Zaidi maintains back-channel ties with Faiq Zaidan, who, while perceived as closer to Tehran, retains the leverage to balance both camps and was instrumental in brokering the nomination itself. He also enjoys working relationships with former Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, an intelligence figure with stronger links to the United States, as well as with Ammar al-Hakim, Mohammed al-Halbousi, the Sadrist movement, and the Barzani and Talabani families. This web of relationships gives al-Zaidi unusual reach across Iraq's fractured political landscape, but it also means that any decisive move against the PMF would risk fracturing the same coalition that brought him to office.
Whether al-Zaidi will ultimately fulfill American expectations and pull Baghdad further into Washington's orbit remains an open question. The structural constraints are formidable. Roughly 2,500 U.S. troops remain on Iraqi soil, while Iran-aligned factions field a fighting force more than forty times larger. Iraq's oil revenues, which account for nearly ninety percent of state income, are largely held in accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, giving Washington direct leverage over the country's financial lifeline. At the same time, Iranian influence in Iraq remains deeply entrenched, and Tehran's overarching strategy of preserving a unified Iraqi state, while embedding its allies within the system, continues to hold.
The architecture of the new government also signals a possible departure from the al-Sudani model. Under al-Sudani, several ministers simultaneously held deputy prime minister positions, concentrating both executive and political authority. Al-Zaidi, by contrast, is reportedly leaning toward a more segmented structure, with four dedicated deputy prime ministers (two Shia, one Sunni, and one Kurd) who will not hold ministerial portfolios. Such a design could improve administrative focus, but it also risks diffusing decision-making authority and weakening the prime minister's hand at the precise moment when external pressures demand decisive leadership.
While the names of the actual ministers have not yet been confirmed, the distribution of ministries among the political components has largely been finalized. Under al-Zaidi's proposed structure, the new government will consist of 23 ministries, allocated as follows:
The Shia parties will hold the ministries of oil, finance, health, electricity, agriculture, transport, water resources, social affairs, education, human rights, and youth and sports. Within this share, the Reconstruction and Development Coalition led by al-Sudani, which won 46 parliamentary seats, is expected to receive five portfolios, including the sovereign Ministry of Finance.
The Sunni parties will lead the ministries of planning, defense, trade, industry, culture, and higher education, with the Progress Party of Speaker Haibet al-Halbousi expected to claim higher education. Negotiations remain tense after al-Halbousi reportedly raised the ceiling of his bloc's demands in recent days.
The Kurds will lead foreign affairs, justice, reconstruction and housing, and environment. The Kurdistan Democratic Party, which won 26 seats, is expected to take the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which secured 15, will receive the Ministry of Justice.
Minority parties will be allocated the Ministry of Migration and Displacement.
Distribution within the Coordination Framework is being managed through a "points system," under which ministries are weighted between roughly 10 and 16 points based on political, financial, and service value, and securing a sovereign portfolio requires a minimum of 14 parliamentary seats.
The plan has been submitted for review. Al-Zaidi has formed two parallel teams, one to draft the government program and another to select the ministerial cabinet. Once all participating blocs agree on their respective candidates, the package will be presented to parliament for a vote of confidence. The next several weeks will reveal whether al-Zaidi can convert his unusual position, that of a political outsider with broad personal networks but no independent base, into the leverage required to navigate between Washington's demands, Tehran's red lines, and the entrenched interests of the very blocs that delivered him to power.
